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ISSUE PAPER
DOES ANTITRUST REGULATION VIOLATE THE
RULE OF LAW?
Elbert L. Robertson'
P rofessor Stucke has presented a rich and provocative issue
paper detailing the modern Rule of Reason's functional
foibles, pitfalls and methodological infirmities. He cites the Rule
of Reason's propensity towards inaccuracy, poor
administrability, subjectivity, lack of transparency, vagueness,
logical circularity and yielding inconsistent results. As you reflect
on Professor Stucke's critique of the Rule, Justice Peckham's
literalist interpretive alternative of Trans Missouri fame (a largely
discredited relic of antitrust history) begins to look comparatively
refreshing. These formalistic, functional and consequential
shortcomings of the Rule of Reason make its use highly
problematic under the Rule of Law.' Prof. Stucke states, "Under
the rule of law, enforcement authorities apply clear legal
prohibitions to particular facts with sufficient transparency,
uniformity, and predictability so that private actors can
reasonably anticipate what actions would be prosecuted and
fashion their behavior accordingly. The law should be
sufficiently specific and its enforcement predictable and fair."
Statutory interpretive norms like the Rule of Reason in the
context of the Sherman Antitrust Act, serve as foundational
secondary rules as in H.L.A. Hart's Concept of Law provides
functional legitimacy for competition policy commands and
decisions within our legal system. We can say that a legal system
satisfies the Rule of Law if its commands are generally binding
Professor, Suffolk University Law School, Boston, Massachusetts.
See Peter C. Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust:
The Chicago Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the "Rule of Reason" in
Restraint of Trade Analysis, 15 REs. L. & ECON. 1 (1992).
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and authoritative, knowable and performable.2 Of particular
importance for the development of my thesis is Professor Stucke's
assertion that under the Rule of Law, antitrust enforcement must
be clear and fair. I strongly agree, and have argued elsewhere
that the devolution of "bright line" per se doctrine in favor of
complex and murky Rule of Reason decisional processes will
often result in substantively unfair outcomes to an injured
antitrust plaintiff. This devolution exclusively focuses on Chicago
School neoclassical economic efficiency oriented value when
evaluating a defendant's alleged anticompetitive conduct, or its
effects (vertical and increasingly horizontal).' The substantive
unfairness is the denial of compensatory relief to injured market
competitors unless some proof is made of economically inefficient
"public injury" to the competitive process itself, regardless of the
relative economic position of the parties or the form of the
injurious restraint. In fact, in terms of the Rule of Law's
precondition of outcome predictability, extensive Rule of Reason
processes have a well-recognized predictability feature. As Prof.
Steve Calkins has noted in his "Not a Quick Look But not the
Full Monty" article on the problematic nature of California
Dentists'4 quick look Rule of Reason process, "beneath the
surface lies a truth that plaintiffs and prosecutors understand all
too well: when the full, formal rule of reason is the governing
standard, plaintiffs almost never win."5
In sum, with the devolution of the per se rule and the
ascendency of the Rule of Reason, a presumed over-inclusive
secondary rule (per se) is replaced by a vague, effectively under-
inclusive secondary rule (the Rule of Reason). Professor Stucke is
correct when he observes that the Rule of Reason is an undefined
rule ex ante, embracing antitrust's most vague and open-ended
principles while simultaneously incorporating essentially
contested paradigms of neoclassical economic theory for
"efficient" competitive end state solutions. Attempts have been
made to formalistically restructure the Rule of Reason into a
more "workable" and or "flexible" operational test than the
onerous, vague, indeterminate balancing of incommensurables
2 Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV.
781 (1989).
1 See Elbert L. Robertson, A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust
Regulation, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 741 (2000).
4 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. United States, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
' Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look But
Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 521 (1999)
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offered by Brandeis in CBOT, or the original general
announcement of the Rule as the operational measure of
promoting competition for purposes of interpreting the Sherman
Act since Standard Oil. Variants of the. Rule of Reason, like the
modern Quick Look methodology have emerged to allow the
federal courts a means of sidestepping the analytic quagmire of a
full blown Rule of Reason inquiry without risking the dangers of
per se condemnation (e.g., false positives, structural
inappropriateness). However the legacy of California Dentists
leaves the subjective touchstone of a federal judge's "intuition" as
the threshold condition for the application of this more
streamlined alternative. This result hardly advances the Rule of
Law Requirement that legal decision-making by rendering
authority be objectively determinant and predictable.
Despite these difficulties, the Rule of Reason remains the
primary interpretive paradigm for adjudication for Sherman Act
cases involving horizontal and vertical restraints on competition,
with even further devolution of the per se rule evidenced by the
recent Leegin decision which overturned the 90 year precedent of
Dr. Miles which held that vertical minimum RPM was per se
illegal price fixing. Citing modern neoclassical economic
arguments for the procompetitive benefits of RPM and the
greater higher risk of "false positives" associated with per se
condemnation, the Court shelved Dr. Miles opting instead for a
Rule of Reason assessment of whether minimum RPM violates
the Sherman Act. Can such radical departure from stare decisis
and precedent (antitrust common law precedent and
congressional legislation limiting minimum RPM) be consistent
with Rule of Law if it substitutes a secondary rule norm that
itself conflicts with the substantive requirements of the Rule of
Law, namely clarity, determinacy and fairness? Will adopting
the Rule of Reason in the Leegin litigation context raise the
probability of facilitating false negatives by essentially
immunizing dealer-based RPM from detection by making
plaintiffs' discovery too costly or onerous?
Prof. Stucke's issue paper on the Rule of Reason is highly
successful in raising these troubling questions. As a point of
departure from the framework his paper established, I would ask
are any alternatives to these conflicts with the Rule of Law and
precedent raised by predominant interpretive role the Rule of
Reason plays in Sherman Act adjudication? One suggestion is to
move antitrust law adjudication more firmly into its regulatory
mode. Antitrust law is often characterized as an alternative to
Vol. 22:1
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economic regulation because it is the law of free and open market
competition, merely stating and reinforcing the "rules of the
game" and not dictating the results of the competitive process.
The fixed determination of price, output quantity and
distribution (or redistribution) is the hallmark of a planned or
regulated economy. Antitrust law does not fix or allow the fixing
of prices or quantities, nor does it command ex ante distribution
of goods produced in a competitive market economy. However
this definitional separation is artificial, historical and overly-
simplistic in light of antitrust reality. The truth is that antitrust
law is most often effective economic regulation. I am shocked at
this heretical assertion - equivalent to shock that there was
gambling in Casablanca. Antitrust adjudication in the federal
courts determines winners and losers in disputes about market
competition under the Sherman, Clayton, Robinson Patman and
FTC Acts, and to this extent, it regulates markets (prices, pricing
and production) for goods in interstate commerce indirectly.
Antitrust-oriented law and policymaking processes directly
regulate the marketplace by rulemaking and adjudication of
federal administrative agencies with economic competition and
regulatory mandates written into their enabling legislation by
Congress.
The paradigmatic example of an independent federal
agency with explicit antitrust regulatory responsibility is the US
Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC"). An important point
from American legal history is that the 1914 legislation that
became the FTC Act passed largely in response to political
demands for institutionalized competition policy expertise
designed to help the federal courts navigate application of the
nebulous Rule of Reason as announced by Justice White in
Standard Oil. The FTC has a broad and general mandate to
curb "unfair methods of competition." It has been argued that
adjudication and rulemaking processes by the FTC would offer a
superior alternative to the federal courts' inconsistent and
unworkable applications of Rule of Reason.6 Its superiority
would stem from its primary expertise in antitrust and
competition policy issues. Federal judges, on the other hand, are
legal generalists and lack such technical expertise or competence
to correctly resolve complex trade regulation policy disputes.
Under the Chevron doctrine federal courts would defer to the
6 See Willard K. Tom & Chul Pak, Toward a Flexible Rule of Reason, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 391 (2000).
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FTC's policy judgments.
A good example of antitrust regulatory rulemaking is
presented by the DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors.7  The purpose of these
Guidelines is to give clear guidance to horizontal competitors
about the range of collaborative activity permitted by the agency,
and therefore not in violation of the antitrust laws, especially
competition-enhancing activities like R&D. To the extent that
published guidelines promote transparency, clarity and
predictability, they serve a basic Rule of Law enhancing purpose.
However, close inspection of the Guidelines' provisions reveals
that they are almost totally premised on a Rule of Reason
balancing of the perceived efficiency benefits of competitor
collaborations regardless of the form those collaborations take.
Therefore, a horizontal collaboration involving a naked restraint
of trade that generated significant efficiencies would not be
prohibited. What implications does this have for enforcement in
the Maricopa County or Topco context? Even Palmer would
receive rule of reason evaluation under these Guidelines.
While the guidelines recognize per se rules, they also state
that the agencies will evaluate all efficiency-enhancing
collaborations as mere ancillary restraints under the Rule of
Reason. If the Rule of Reason's reliance on nebulous, efficiency-
balancing norms conflicts with the Rule of Law's basic tenets,
these Guidelines must also conflict with the Rule of Law, because
despite expressed recognition of per se illegality, any restraint
reasonably ancillary to an efficient integration will always be
allowed. The possibility of false negatives will be present
whenever naked ancillary restraints of trade are part and parcel
of collaborations that have more apparent efficiency benefits on
balance. How is it that the danger of permitting false negatives is
so less important than the danger of false positives associated
with the per se rule? From the perspective of corrective justice,
the option of allowing the FTC to administratively settle
competition disputes between private parties is inadequate
because there is no right of private or state enforcement of
Section 5. Therefore, there is no administrative scheme for
compensating private antitrust injury. This is substantively
unfair and, as I have argued elsewhere, inconsistent with the
7 See U.S. Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines
for Collaboration Among Competitors, § 3.2 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
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dictates of the Rule of Law.
Finally, from a legal process perspective, what does it
mean to utilize the Rule of Reason as a mode of interpretation,
given its infirmities? The decision to privilege neoclassical
economic cost-benefit approaches in interpreting a statute that
doesn't even have the word "competition" in its text is inherently
political.8 California Dentists demonstrates how the Court may
refuse to defer the FTC's fact-finding process as presenting
"substantial evidence" under APA Sections 556 and 557, earning
Chevron deference if its application of the rule is intuitively
suspect. If antitrust law is to be successfully integrated into the
broader body of a legal system that promotes both justice and
economy under the Rule of Law, then the Rule of Reason must be
more that a rubric for neoclassical efficiency balancing. In
interpreting the Sherman Act under the Rule of Law, the rule
must be reasonable, fair, efficient and consistent.
8 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
